This chapter aims to demonstrate that morality is neither a specific type of phenomenon— save in its metalinguistic dimension—nor corresponds to a particular kind of object. Instead, it constitutes a dimension of every social phenomenon. This is the dimension relating to the interpellation of actions/ situations by social actors in terms of values. It is an unavoidable part of the effectuation (the observation of the effects) of actions and/or situations and thus of social life. Values here are the different forms assumed by the idea of good, which becomes the central variable in the effectuation of phenomena. This chapter then proposes a pragmatic and interpretive model for the sociology of morality. This approach emphasizes the forms through which actors define and operate morality, based on mapping the elements integral to this dimension, located in the intermediate space between valuative metaphysics (inter-subjective abstraction) and situated pragmatics (concrete situations). Thus, there is as much morality to be analyzed in any social phenomenon—the forming of a couple, the adoption of a profession, or the decisions taken in a game—as there is in supposedly “traditional” objects of studies of moralities, such as genocide or, conversely, humanitarian actions.